The book concludes with "Plutarch's Readers" (Part Four, 188-195), from the Renaissance to our day. Lamberton properly chastises the Penguin practice of chopping the paired *Lives* apart and re-arranging them into topical units for textbook use, "patched together into potted history, or substitutes for history—precisely what Plutarch emphatically tells us he did not set out to write" (211-212). Yet the wide and inexpensive availability of such abominations helps ensure that Plutarch's "real readership" today is still, as in Antiquity and in the Renaissance, where he intended it to be—"in university classrooms" (194). And rightly so; for Plutarch's rhetoric, "for all its artificiality, paradoxically breathes into those ancient lives a new energy, illuminates them with a bright and engaging light" (195). To engage the reader—that is what Lamberton has done in this splendid little introduction to Plutarch. It is an intelligent book, and a pleasure to read.

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The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics. By BRAD INWOOD. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. ix + 438. ISBN 0-521-77005-X.

This handsome, hefty volume—the latest installment in its series—"is intended for readers of various kinds" (2) and is designed to be a guide to an entire philosophical tradition. Yet non-specialists may well find that the level of sophistication of some of its fifteen chapters strains their abilities. It contains an introduction by the editor, two chapters on the ancient history of the school, eleven chapters on major themes, and two chapters on the influence of Stoicism in early modern philosophy. An extensive bibliography, a list of primary works, a mediocre general index, and a convenient index of passages are included. In what follows I offer very brief summaries of the essays.

Inwood suggests that Stoicism is an intellectual odyssey (1) in its historical trajectory, (2) because the historian of philosophy must be *polutropos* to recover it, and (3) for those exercised by it, because "the ongoing confrontation with Stoicism is one which refines philosophical intuitions, challenges both imagination and analytical talents, and leads ultimately to hard philosophical choices which, if taken seriously, define the kind of life one chooses to lead" (1–2).

In Chapter One, David Sedley traces the history of the Stoa from inception to Arius Didymus. He divides the tradition into five phases: (1) the first generation (Zeno of Citium, who founded the school in Athens; Cleanthes of Assos); (2) the era of the early Athenian scholarchs (Chrysippus); (3) the Platonizing phase or 'Middle Stoicism' (Panaetius, Posidonius); (4) the first century B.C.E. decentralization (after Sulla's sack of Athens, philosophical activity moved to Rhodes); (5) the imperial phase. Sedley's synopsis emphasizes continuity over radical change.

Christopher Gill observes in Chapter Two that during the Roman Empire Stoicism was the dominant philosophical movement, was propounded by numerous teachers, and was strongly embedded in Greco-Roman culture.

R. J. Hankinson's chapter on Stoic epistemology will rebuff the reader who is not inured to the stilted, jargon-laden style of analytic philosophy. Only expert epistemologists conversant with modal and symbolic logic can traverse this rough terrain. Hankinson thinks the Stoics need a powerful epistemology in order to suppose that the infallibility of Stoic Sages can ever be attained or at least approached as a regulative ideal. He traces the origins of that epistemology and both its resilience and development under the attacks of the Sceptics.

Chapter Four is Susanne Bobzien's clear, though increasingly technical overview of Stoic logic. The formal symbolism that her subject forces upon her will test the nonspecialist.

Michael White writes a clear, well structured account of 'physics' as the topics of the cosmos, the elements (*stoicheia*), and causes (*aitiologia*). The Stoics believed that knowledge of the natural world is sought in order to enable us to live in conformity with nature. White explicates their doctrines of corporealism, vitalism, cosmic unity and cohesion, eternal recurrence, causal determinism *with* human responsibility (i.e. soft determinism), and denial of limits/surfaces.

The Stoics regarded theology as part of physics, Keimpe Algra explains in Chapter Six. Since it was considered both as the culmination of the philosophical curriculum and as a basis for ethics, theology was regarded as of central importance to the whole system.

In Chapter Seven, Dorothea Frede compares Aristotle's non-deterministic views with the Stoics' cosmic, physical, and teleological determinism. She explains how their doctrines of fate and *sumpatheia* within nature supported the practices of divination *and* legitimized astrology as a science. Hers is an excellent exposition of how the Stoics did not accede to a fateful resignation, but instead had good reasons for recommending active involvement in the world's concerns.

Stoic metaphysics is ably surveyed in Chapter Eight by Jacques Brunschwig. He contends that the ontological concepts and theories of the Stoics transcend their division of philosophy into logic, ethics, and physics, and thereby constitute a meta-philosophy.

In Chapter Nine Malcolm Schofield offers a fine overview of Stoic ethics. He portrays Cynicism and Stoicism as versions of Socratic ethics. Schofield suggests that Zeno systematized the Socratic-Cynic philosophy. He distinguishes two projects: (1) laying out the definitions and divisions of the key concepts in discursive ethical discourse, and (2) trying to explain and establish by argument the Stoic view on key ethical subjects.

Stoic Moral Psychology occupies Chapter Ten. Tad Brennan's account has long, often onerous footnote commentary, but he supplies many illuminating explications. Two of those explications are notable: (1) the account of how to understand the psychology of selecting 'indifferents' and (2) his emphasis on the Stoics' interest in the power of the beliefs that constitute emotions to *cause actions* rather than a concern with how those emotions *feel*. In his account of deliberation Brennan neglects to discuss Lawrence Becker's take in *A New Stoicism* (Princeton University Press, 1998)—a work cited elsewhere in the volume (Long, 366n., 392n.; Bibliography 395).

Inwood notes that Stoicism had a profound influence on intellectual life outside of its logic, physics, and ethics, so three short chapters on medicine, grammar, and the astronomical sciences are included. Portions of Hankinson's chapter on ancient medicine are relevant to Aristotle's biology, not to Stoicism; he sketches the cross-fertilization of ideas between physicians and both Stoic *and non-Stoic* philosophers. David Blank and Catherine Atheron select topics in which more definite influence between Stoic and traditional grammar can be discerned for their cautious survey of ancient grammar and linguistics: syntax, parts of speech, cases, and morphosyntactic properties. Alexander Jones shows that the possibilities of interaction between Stoicism and the evolving sciences of astronomy, astrology, and geography were greater than those between Epicureanism and these disciplines, whose foundations directly conflicted with the basis of Epicurus' atomistic, aleatory cosmology.

In Chapter Fourteen, T. H. Irwin identifies three doctrines that were inseparable for the Stoics: Eudaemonism (the ultimate end for rational action is the agent's own happiness), Naturalism (happiness and virtue consist in living in accord with nature), and Moralism (virtue is to be chosen for its own sake and is preferred over all things with non-moral value). He outlines the acceptance of these doctrines by the Scholastic naturalists Aquinas, Suarez, and Grotius and deftly flags some philosophical problems that arise from the

partial or complete rejection of them by Pufendorf, Butler, and Hutcheson.

The more graceful essay is A. A. Long's. Chapter Fifteen is an elegant study of Stoic influences in Spinoza, Justus Lipsius, and Joseph Butler. Long argues that the deepest reason that there has been no fully authentic Neo-Stoicism is the ancient Stoics' rigorously *coherent* conception of the world as a vitalist, completely rational, causally determined system, providentially governed by a fully immanent God. He aptly illustrates this idea by quoting Cicero's description of Stoicism (*De Finibus* III 74) as "a system such that to remove one letter would be to destroy the whole account" (368). *This* is the system within which the Stoics firmly grounded their account of the good life. Long's essay shows better than any other how the various parts of Stoicism fit together, thus nicely concluding the volume.

The method of dividing sections is entirely idiosyncratic to each chapter. The editor could have corrected this lack of uniformity. Nevertheless, the quality of the essays overall is excellent, so this *Companion* is a valuable resource for tough-minded readers who are serious about the challenging philosophy that is Stoicism.

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